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and the Business Cycle*
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complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment 
variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job 
market matching model, show analytically how variations in the participation rate are driven 
by the cross-sectional density of home productivity near the participation threshold, and how 
this density translates into an extensive-margin labor supply elasticity. A calibration of the 
model to macro data not only matches employment and participation variabilities but also 
generates strongly countercyclical unemployment rates. With some wage rigidity the model 
also matches unemployment variations well. Furthermore, the labor supply elasticity implied 
by our calibration is consistent with microeconometric evidence for the US. 
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1 Introduction
It is nowwidely recognized that the labor market participation rate is an important
determinant of aggregate output dynamics in the long run (Ngai and Pissarides,
2006). A large part of the difference in GDP per capita between the US and Eu-
rope can be explained by the higher participation rate in the US (Prescott, 2004).
What has not been clear so far is whether short-run fluctuations of the participa-
tion rate play a significant role in modeling the business cycle. On the one hand,
Shimer (2005b) documents that flows into and out of the labor force are crucial to
explain employment and unemployment variability, on the other hand the fluctua-
tions in the participation rate over the cycle have not been very strong over the last
decades. Moreover, existing models that attempt to explain the cyclical behavior
of the participation rate generate grossly counterfactual implications for key labor
market statistics such as a positive correlation of unemployment and GDP. This has
lead to the conclusion that standard theories of search may be incompatible with
endogenous search intensity (Shimer, 2004) or endogenous participation decisions
(Veracierto, 2004).
In this paper, however, we show that a standard model of labor search and en-
dogenous labor market participation is successful in explaining the dynamics of la-
bor market aggregates over the business cycle. In particular, our model generates a
strong negative correlation between unemployment andGDP.We find that endoge-
nous participation helps in explaining the variability of employment over the cycle.
It gives a greater magnification of technology shocks than the standard matching
model. A flexible wage version of the model shares the well known shortcoming
of the matching model that it underpredicts the observed unemployment fluctua-
tions. We therefore consider a simple form of wage rigidity as suggested by Shimer
(2005a). This version of the model jointly explains the variability of employment,
participation, and unemployment.
We carefully investigate which features of our model are necessary to explain
the countercyclical response of unemployment. The intuition behind the procycli-
cal unemployment rate in previous papers (Faraglia, 2003; Shimer, 2004; Tripier,
2002; Veracierto, 2004) is that a large number of people join the labor force in booms
when expected wages are high. Matching, however, takes time and so the unem-
ployment rate initially increases in booms, until the new entrants are absorbed into
employment.3 The strength of this effect depends crucially on the mass of workers
3This argument is also present in the popular press (Reuters, 2004) and in speeches by Fed Gover-
nor Kohn (2004).
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that are close to the participation margin. We calibrate this density using informa-
tion on the cross-sectional distribution of market wages. It turns out that with this
calibration, the model explains the cyclical variability of participation, and in ad-
dition generates an aggregate labor supply elasticity that is consistent with recent
microeconometric evidence.
We are not the first to model participation decisions in a job matching frame-
work. Recently, Pries and Rogerson (2004) have emphasized the heterogeneity of
expected durations in participation spells and implications for cross-country differ-
ences. Kim (2003) and Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) have studied the effects of la-
bor market policies in matching models with endogenous participation. They con-
sider only steady states, not fluctuations. Themodel setup in Garibaldi and Wasmer
(2005) is particularly similar to ours in many respects. Our finding that endogenous
participation is successful in modeling labor market fluctuations supports those
models and strengthens their findings.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model
and some analytical results. Section 3 discusses the data and calibration. Sections 4
and 5 provide numerical results for the calibrated model and Section 6 concludes.
Proofs are in Appendix A.
2 Model
The model is in the spirit of the simplest model of equilibrium unemployment (e.g.
Pissarides 2000, chapter 1). We shall introduce the participation decision in a very
tractable way, such that we can handle both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks
easily. First we discuss the household decision problem and subsequently describe
the formation of employment relationships and the wage determination. We char-
acterize the steady state equilibrium and illustrate the effect of participation using
comparative statics. In this context two important simplifying assumptions are pre-
sented, which will help to limit the degree of heterogeneity in the labor market and
make more analytical results available. Finally we analyze the model dynamics in
the presence of aggregate shocks with and without the simplifying assumptions.
2.1 Basic setup
2.1.1 Households
The economy is populated by a constantmass of ex ante identical one-personhouse-
holds, whichwe call workers. The situation of eachworker at time t is characterized
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by two idiosyncratic state variables, her employment status s(t) (either employed,
s(t) = e, or not employed, s(t) = n), and her current level of home productivity h(t).
Those who are not employed can choose to actively search for a job, and thus
participate in the labor market, or not. This is the only decision that the agents
have to make. Those who decide not to participate but rather stay at home are
called nonparticipants, or out of the labor force. They engage in home production
which yields the utility flow h(t). We think of this utility as all kinds of returns to
being at home, from taking care of your children or growing vegetables in your
backyard to moonlighting. Obviously, home productivity varies over time due to
life cycle and other reasons, and we allow for this by assuming that h(t) is redrawn
from a distribution F (h)with constant exogenous Poisson arrival rate η. Changing
idiosyncratic home productivity over time implies that flows into and out of the
labor force occur even in the absence of aggregate shocks. For example, a high
enough draw of h can induce unemployed agents to leave the labor force. The
steady state analysis of participation by Pissarides (2000, chapter 7) abstracts from
changes in idiosyncratic home productivity, which limits its applicability to long-
run considerations.
Nonemployed agents who actively search for a job are called unemployed and
by definition participate in the labor market. They receive the flow utility b(h),
which includes unemployment benefits and some level of home production, net of
search costs, which in general will depend on the worker’s home productivity h.
We assume
0≤ b′ (h)≤ 1 (1)
A searcher’s probability λ of finding a job depends only on the aggregate state of
nature. The worker cannot increase this probability. Those who are employed do
not enjoy any home production, but they earn a wage w. The wage depends on the
productivity of the match, and in general also on home productivity h. To obtain
a very simple and tractable model, we will later state assumptions that guarantee
that the wage is the same for all workers.
We assume that match output is equal to aggregate productivity z. Thus all
workers have the same market productivity and differ only in home productiv-
ity. In reality, it is clear that both types of productivity vary between households
and over time. What determines the participation decision is mainly the differ-
ence between market and home productivity. For simplicity, however, all models
that we know of set either market or home productivity as constant across agents.
For example, Chang and Kim (2003a) and Pries and Rogerson (2004) let the market
productivity vary, while in Pissarides (2000, Chapter 7) or Garibaldi and Wasmer
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(2005) it is the home productivity that varies. In this respect, we follow the sec-
ond approach, because it turns out that a model with constant market and variable
home productivity is much easier to handle, as will become clear in Section 2.5.
Notice also that there is no cost of switching between unemployment and non-
participation, and a household’s decision to participate is therefore independent of
whether the household participated last period or not. In this sense, nonparticipa-
tion is not a third (predetermined) labor market state, but only a decision variable of
the household.4
2.1.2 Job Creation and Wage Determination
All filled jobs at time t produce output at the flow rate z(t), because the market
productivity is the same across workers. Job separations are purely exogenous and
occur with constant flow probability χ. We make this assumption not only for sim-
plicity. Indeed, it is straightforward to incorporate endogenous separations. The
point of this assumption is to highlight that the negative correlation between GDP
and unemployment in the model is not caused by an anticyclical separation rate,
but by the dynamics of firms’ hirings. Furthermore, it has recently been argued
(Shimer, 2005b) from an empirical standpoint that the separation rate is roughly
constant over the business cycle.
To form new employment relationships, workers must search and firms must
post vacancies. In line with the literature, we assume that the total number of new
matches M is produced by a Cobb-Douglas matching function
M = µUϑV 1−ϑ (2)
whereU is the size of the unemployment pool (the non-employedwho search),V is
the total number of vacancies, µ is a scaling parameter and ϑ is the matching elas-
ticity. Defining aggregate labor market tightness θ ≡V/U , we obtain the matching
probabilities of the firm and the worker (λ) as
M
V
= q(θ) (3)
M
U
= θq(θ) ≡ λ (4)
where
q(θ)≡ µθ−ϑ. (5)
4We have been experimenting with an extended version of the model to allow for a fixed cost
of entering the labor market. It turned out that this has very little effect on our main results for
reasonable values of the fixed cost, and so these experiments are not reported here.
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Wages are determined by generalized Nash bargaining5. The corresponding
first order condition is α
1−α =
ΣWi (h)
Ji (h)
(6)
where α is the bargaining weight of the worker, ΣWi (h) is the surplus that a worker
with home productivity h gets from having a job when aggregate productivity is
zi, and Ji (h) is the value that the firm has from having the job filled. Formulas for
ΣWi (h) and Ji (h)will be derived below.
In order to post a vacancy, firms have to pay a hiring cost of φ per unit time. Free
entry assures that expected values of a vacancy are zero. Therefore the expected
surplus that a worker generates for the firm has to equal the expected hiring cost.
2.1.3 Aggregate productivity
The output of employment relationships at time t is determined by the aggregate
productivity parameter z(t). It follows a finite-state continuous-time Markov pro-
cess, taking values zi where i = 1, . . . ,Nz. The Poisson rate at which the process
switches from realization zi to z j is denoted by pi, j . Since our model is in continu-
ous time, pi, j is the rate at which the probability to be in state z j increases over time
if we start from zi. Therefore pi,i =−∑ j =i pi, j.
2.2 Important special cases
In much of the following analysis we will consider two special cases that signifi-
cantly simplify the model. Since none of these assumptions is obviously realistic,
we will document carefully how the model solution changes when we relax these
assumptions.
One important complication in the model is that the home productivity of a
worker enters the outside option in the wage negotiation, such that workers with
higher home productivity end up getting higher wages. To avoid this, wewill often
make the assumption that workers cannot realize their home productivity while
engaged in search activities. Workers then only receive a constant utility flow b0,
which can be interpreted as unemployment benefits plus some minimum home
productivity:
5 We are aware that continuous Nash bargaining is blamed as the major culprit of the matching
model’s incapability to generate large unemployment fluctuations. It is trivial to substitute other
wage determination mechanisms for Nash bargaining in this model, as we will illustrate in Section
2.6. However, it is instructive to start from the best understood case, which is still Nash bargaining.
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Assumption 1 (ConstB). The flow utility while unemployed is the same for all workers,
b(h)≡ b0.
We will see in Section 2.3 that in the model without aggregate shocks, this as-
sumption is sufficient tomake all workers get the samewage. In themodel with ag-
gregate productivity shocks, we need an additional assumption that is introduced
in Section 2.4.
To understand the next assumption, recall that we have assumed that a non-
employed worker redraws home productivity with flow probability η, while an
employed worker redraws only at job separation, which happens with probabil-
ity χ. This introduces some unusual incentives. For example, when χ > η, a non-
employedwith low home productivity has an incentive to look for a job not just be-
cause she then collects a wage, but also because employment increases her chances
for a new draw of home productivity. This is somewhat artificial; a more compli-
cated model (Garibaldi and Wasmer, 2005) would separate these two events, and
consider endogenous separation after the redraw of an employed worker. Rather
than complicating the model, we simplify it by considering the special case where
the two probabilities are equal.
Assumption 2 (EtaChi). The job separation rate equals the redraw probability, η= χ.
We will show that relaxing this assumption does not change any qualitative
conclusions.
2.3 The model with constant aggregate labor productivity
Before looking at the model with aggregate productivity shocks, it is worthwhile
to analyze the model with constant aggregate labor productivity in more detail.
Since most aggregate variables only depend on aggregate productivity (and not on
the employment rate), we can analyze the effects of parametric changes in aggre-
gate productivity or unemployment benefits on variables such as market tightness
θ. Shimer (2005a) has emphasized that a comparate steady state analysis can pro-
vide a good approximation to the dynamics of the matching model, because the
dynamic model quickly reaches the new flow equilibrium after a shock.
We first state themodel equations in Section 2.3.1. In Section 2.3.2 we show that,
under Assumptions ConstB and EtaChi, our model yields the same predictions
about wages and labor market tightness as the standard matching model with con-
stant participation. This result is used in Section 2.3.3 to make an important point:
endogenous participation makes employment more variable and unemployment
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less variable. Since the standard model underpredicts the variability of both se-
ries in comparison to US data, we can say that endogenous participation helps to
explain employment dynamics and makes it harder to explain unemployment dy-
namics. In Section 2.3.4 we drop Assumption ConstB. We show that in this case, a
change in productivity or unemployment benefits changes the composition of the
unemployment pool. We investigate how this affects the dynamics of labor mar-
ket tightness, and show that endogenous participation reinforces the critique of the
standard matching model found in Costain and Reiter (2003) and Shimer (2005a).
2.3.1 Recursive formulation of the model
Standard techniques can be used to show that the value of being non-employed
satisfies the following recursive equation:
rV n (h) = η(Vn−Vn (h))+max{b(h)+λ (Ve (h)−Vn (h)) ,h} (7)
where V n ≡   ∞−∞Vn (h)dF(h) denotes the expected value of being non-employed,
conditional on a redraw of home productivity. The first alternative in (7) is realized
if the worker decides to participate in the labor market (unemployed), the second
alternative if she decides to stay at home (out of the labor force). It is straightfor-
ward to show that the solution of the maximization problem is characterized by a
threshold level hc, where the non-employed are indifferent between searching or
not. This threshold satisfies
hc = b(hc)+λ (Ve (hc)−Vn (hc)) . (8)
At the threshold, the flow utility from home production is equal to unemployment
benefits plus home production under search, plus the value of the chance of finding
a job. A household participates in the labor market if its home productivity is below
the threshold level. Similarly, the flow value of being employed and the flow value
of a filled job satisfy
rV e (h) = w(h)+χ(Vn−Ve (h)) (9)
rJ (h) = z−w(h)+χ(0− J (h)) . (10)
The first order condition for the generalized Nash bargaining solution can now
be written as
αJ (h) = (1−α)ΣW (h) = (1−α)(Ve (h)−Vn (h)) . (11)
In the absence of aggregate shocks a worker with home productivity h < hc will
always participate, therefore his threatpoint could directly be written as the value
of a non-employed searcher.
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Free entry implies that expected hiring costs equal the expected value of a filled
job:
φ
q(θ) =
 hc
−∞
J (h) dF(h)
1
F(hc)
. (12)
The steady state is then characterized by the six equations (7)–(12) in the unknown
functions Vn (h), Ve (h), J (h), w(h) and variables hc and θ.
2.3.2 The equilibrium wage and labor market tightness
Similarly to the standard textbook model, the steady state of the model is charac-
terized by the wage curve (WC):
w(h) =
r+η+λ
r+η+αλαz+
r+χ
r+η+αλ (1−α)b(h)+ (η−χ)Ψ(h
c) (13)
Ψ(hc)≡ r
r+η+αλ (1−α)Vn
and the job creation condition (JCC):
 hc
−∞
w(h)dF(h)
1
F(hc)
= z− φ
q(θ)(r+χ). (14)
The derivation is in Appendix A. WC differs from the standard model in two
ways. First, the wage of a worker depends on her idiosyncratic home productivity
through b(h). Second, the term (η−χ)Ψ(hc) captures the effect that having a job
changes a worker’s chances of redrawing home productivity, which was discussed
in Section 2.2. Through this additional term, the endogenous threshold level hc
enters the WC. For this reason — unlike in the standard model — we cannot use
Equs. (13) and (14) to fully solve for the wage w and labor market tightness θ.
Both problems disappear if we adopt Assumptions ConstB and EtaChi. With
η = χ, the last term drops out of the wage curve (13), and with it any reference
to hc. Assumption ConstB eliminates home productivity from the flow utility of
unemployment: b(h) in (13) is replaced by b0, and it becomes obvious that the
wage is the same for all workers. Then it is irrelevant for the firm who it is matched
to, and (13) and (14) simplify to
WC: w=
r+λ+χ
r+χ+αλαz+
r+χ
r+χ+αλ (1−α)b0 (15)
JCC: w= z− φ
q(θ)(r+χ). (16)
Equations (15) and (16) are independent of the participation decision. From here
it is easy to derive the aggregate wage equation for the standard textbook model
(Pissarides, 2000, Eq. 1.20). We therefore obtain
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Proposition 1 (Equivalence). Under AssumptionsConstB and EtaChi, the steady states
and comparative statics of labor market tightness and wages are identical to those in the
model with constant, exogenous labor market participation.
2.3.3 Employment and unemployment
The equivalence result of the last section allows us to disentangle the dynamics
at the employment/unemployment margin — which has been the focus of many
papers — from the dynamics at the participation margin, the focus of our paper.
Proposition 2 (Stocks). Under the assumption EtaChi, the steady state stocks of employ-
ment, unemployment, and participation are given by:
e=
λ
χ+λF(h
c) (17)
u=
χ
χ+λF(h
c) (18)
p= F(hc). (19)
Equ. (17) can be interpreted as follows. The probability of being employed
equals the probability of participating in the labor market (F(hc)) times the prob-
ability of being employed, conditional on participation, λχ+λ . From Proposition 1
we know that the conditional probability is the same as in the standard matching
model, and is procyclical (increasing in z). It is quite obvious (and will be shown
formally in Proposition 4) that participation F(hc) is also procyclical. The partici-
pation margin therefore makes employment even more procyclical. The interpre-
tation of (18) is analogous. The probability χχ+λ of being unemployed, conditional
on participation, is anticyclical. Procyclical participation then dampens the unem-
ployment fluctuations.
Notice that the intuitive result (19) depends in fact on Assumption EtaChi. If
η = χ, householdswith low home productivity, which are typically employed, have
a different redraw probability than households with high home productivity. This
gives a more complicated dynamics of the cross-sectional density of home produc-
tivity, which destroys (19).
2.3.4 The effect of the participation threshold on tightness
The aim of this section is to investigate how changes in market productivity or the
unemployment benefit affect labormarket tightness and the participation threshold
hc. Dropping Assumption ConstB, the next proposition shows that endogenous
participation adds an important element to the dynamics of labor market tightness.
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In the following propositions, dx denotes the change in the equilibrium value
of any variable x. We write the flow utility of unemployment as b(h) = b0 + b1(h),
such that the term db0 means an upward shift of the function b(h).
Proposition 3 (Tightness). Assume EtaChi. Then
dθ
θ =
r+χ+αλ
ϑ(r+χ)+αλ
dz−db0−B′ (hc)dhc
z−B(hc) (20)
where
B(h)≡ 1
F(h)
 h
−∞
b
(
h˜
)
dF(h˜). (21)
Again, under Assumption ConstB, Equ. (20) reduces to the standard formula
(e.g. Mortensen and Nagypal (9/2005, Equ. (10))). Before drawing further conclu-
sions from Proposition 3, we first derive the reaction of hc.
Proposition 4 (Procyclical Participation). Assume EtaChi holds. Then the general equi-
librium response dhc/dz satisfies
d hc
d z
=
αλ
(ϑ(r+χ)+αλ) if b(h)≡ b0 (22)
and αλ
r+χ+αλ r+χ+αλϑ(r+χ)+αλ
≤ d h
c
d z
≤ r+χ+αλϑ(r+χ)+αλ in general. (23)
Furthermore, the general equilibrium response dhc/d b0 satisfies
d hc
d b0
=
(r+χ)ϑ
(ϑ(r+χ)+αλ) if b(h)≡ b0 (24)
and ϑ(r+χ)
(r+χ) (ϑ(r+χ)+αλ)(r+χ+αλ) +αλ
≤ d h
c
d b0
≤ r+χαλ in general. (25)
As one would expect, the threshold level of home productivity hc is procyclical.
More precisely, hc increases in z with a coefficient that is smaller than but close to
unity, since λ >> r+χ in a realistic calibration, and α = ϑ is assumed. Moreover,
Proposition 4 illustrates that hc increases in b0. Higher utility while unemployed
makes it more attractive to look for a job as compared to staying at home. However,
with λ >> r+χ and α= ϑ, we see that d hcd b0 is close to zero.
The essence of Shimer (2005a)’s critique of the matching model with constant
participation is that for standard values of B(h)/z, the elasticity of θw.r.t. z implied
by (20) is smaller than 2, while the data suggest a value of 19.1.6 Costain and Reiter
6Mortensen and Nagypal (9/2005, Section 3) claim that a reasonable estimate of this elasticity is
7.56 rather than 19.1; this argument assumes, however, that a large part of unemployment variations
is not caused by productivity shocks but by variation in interest rates, vacancy costs etc.
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(2003) have stressed that this elasticity depends crucially on the match surplus:
with higher utility of the unemployed B(hc) the instantaneous match surplus z−
B(hc) gets smaller. This means that the surplus is a more highly leveraged func-
tion of productivity z, and therefore the elasticities of the surplus and of vacancy
creation get bigger. This effect can be easily seen in the denominator of (20). How-
ever, they conclude that this is not the solution of Shimer’s problem, because a
smaller match surplus implies an elasticity of market tightness with respect to b0
that is much bigger than what can be inferred from the data. On the other hand,
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) argue that the correct calibration of the matching
model does indeed imply a tiny match surplus for the marginal worker. We will
evaluate their argument in detail in Section 5.
What does endogenous participation add to this discussion if we drop the as-
sumption b(h) ≡ b0? The punchline is that the critique of Shimer (2005a) and
Costain and Reiter (2003) becomes even stronger. The intuition is simple: when
market productivity increases, workers with higher home productivity enter the
labor market. This tends to reduce the average match surplus, and therefore di-
lutes the effect of higher productivity on vacancy creation.
To evaluate this quantitatively, it is instructive to study the following special
case. Assume that the redraw density F (h) is uniform on the interval h¯±σ, and
that b(h) = h− κ. This means that unemployed households enjoy the full home
productivity but face the constant search cost κ. In this case we obtain7 B′ (hc) =
1/2. From Proposition 4 we know that approximately dhc ≈ dz. Using this, the
term in z on the rhs of Equ. (20) is reduced from z to z/2; the elasticity of tightness
with respect to productivity is cut by half. On the other hand, since d h
c
d b0
is small,
the elasticity of θ with respect to b0 is about the same as in the model without
participation decision. The dilemma identified by Costain and Reiter (2003), that
either the elasticity with respect to z is too low, or that with respect to b0 too high,
is therefore magnified by a factor of 2. The numerical results of Section 4.4 will
illustrate that the same logic applies to the cyclical variability of unemployment.
One can argue that the assumptions leading to B′ (hc) = 1/2 are extreme; we will
7Since the participation rate P equals F (hc), we get that h¯−σ = hc−2Pσ. Then we get
B(hc) =
1
P
  hc
hc−2Pσ
(h−κ) 1
2σ dh= h
c−κ−Pσ (26)
Differentiation of (21) givesB′ (h)= f (h)F(h) [b(h)−B(h)]. Using (26), this givesB′ (hc)= 1/2. Interestingly,
this does not depend on the dispersion parameter σ. The intuition is the following. The bigger the
dispersion σ, the greater is the difference in home productivity between the average and the marginal
unemployed. On the other hand, higher dispersion means that fewer workers enter the labor market
after a change in hc. In the special case considered, the two effects exactly cancel.
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discuss this in more depth in Section 4.4.
2.4 Variable productivity: the differentiated-wage model
Allowing for variable aggregate labor productivity increases the complexity of the
model substantially. The main difficulty lies in the fact that workers with different
home productivities will negotiate different wages, for two reasons. First, theymay
get different flow utilities during job search, which affects their outside option. Sec-
ond, even if ConstB is assumed, those with higher home productivity may return
to home productionwhen the aggregate state deteriorates, while otherswill always
stay in the labor market. Workers are therefore not homogeneous from the view-
point of the firm, and when deciding on whether to post a vacancy, a firm has to
consider the current composition of the unemployment pool. The zero profit condi-
tion for vacancy creation involves an integral over the cross-sectional distribution
of home productivity (Γ(h; t)) among the non-employed:
φ(t) = q(t)
 hc(t)
−∞
J(h, t)dΓ(h; t)
/ hc(t)
−∞
dΓ(h; t) . (27)
Technically, this means that the current cross-sectional distribution of the home
productivity of the non-employed becomes a state variable, and techniques similar
to the one used in Krusell and Smith (1998) have to be used. This model, which
we call the “Differentiated-wage (DW) model”, is fully described in Appendix B,
and numerical results will be presented in Section 4.4. No interesting conclusions
can be obtained analytically for this model. We are therefore going to present a
simplified model in the next section.
2.5 Variable productivity: the equal-wage model
We think that it is very useful to have a simple workhorse model available that
is tractable, but yields qualitatively the same solutions as the complicated DW-
model. The purpose of the present section is to develop such amodel. Wewill make
assumptions that guarantee that all workers get the same wage, and we will call
the model the “Equal-wage (EW) model”. In Section 4 we will compare the models
numerically, and we will see that the EWmodel is indeed a good approximation to
the DWmodel.
To make sure that all workers receive the same wage, we first need Assump-
tion ConstB. Second, we need the following new assumption:
Assumption 3 (ResetH). The unemployed worker loses her current level of home produc-
tivity in the moment she is matched to an employer. Instead, she receives a new level h0
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which is small enough that she participates in the labor market under all possible realiza-
tions of the exogenous shock z.
The worker keeps this level of home productivity until the next redraw, which
in case of employed workers is the time of separation from the match. The exact
level of h0 is irrelevant, since the worker keeps participating in any case and re-
ceives b0. The purpose of the assumption is to make sure that all workers have
the same threat point in the negotiation, so that they receive the same wage, and
that firms who post a vacancy do not care which worker they will be matched
to. The technical assumption that workers get their home productivity reduced on
matching is artificial, but is equivalent to a setup where the median worker —who
always participates — determines the wage (e.g. because of unobservable home
productivity)8. With Assumptions ConstB and ResetH, the outside option of the
worker depends only on b0, which is the same for all workers. For the purposes
of the firm, all the workers are identical at the moment they get matched, and they
receive the same wage. Therefore, firms do not have to take the composition of the
unemployment pool into account when making a vacancy posting decision.
The formulas characterizing equilibrium are slight modifications of the ones we
have seen in Section 2.3. It turns out that with equal wages, all the value functions,
as well as labor market tightness and the wage, are functions of the exogenous ag-
gregate productivity only. For example,V ni (h) denotes the value of a non-employed
household with home productivity h if the aggregate productivity is zi. This value
satisfies (recall the notation pi, j from Section 2.1.3):
rV ni (h) = η
(
Vni −Vni (h)
)
+∑
j
pi, jV
n
j (h)+max{b0+λi (Vei −Vni (h)) ,h} . (28)
The solution to the choice problem in (28) is that households stay at home if their
home productivity is greater than the threshold level
hci = b0+λi (Vei −Vni (hci )) . (29)
The value of the employed is
rV ei = wi+χ
(
Vni −Vei
)
+∑
j
pi, jV
e
j (30)
8 We could also assume that before taking on a job (even before negotiating with the employer)
the worker has to undergo an investment in human capital that will remain with him until the next
redraw (which means, he loses his job). If this investment is big enough, once the worker is matched
with an employer, she does not want to leave the labor market under any realization of aggregate
productivity, before she redraws her home productivity. In this case, only the utility flow of the
unemployed affects her outside option.
13
and the value of a filled job is
(r+χ)Ji = zi−wi+∑
j
pi, jJ j. (31)
The first order condition for the Nash bargaining solution is
αJi = (1−α)ΣWi (h0) (32)
where ΣWi (h)≡ (Vei −Vni (h)). Finally, we have the zero profit condition for vacancy
creation:
Ji =
φ
q(θi) . (33)
The model solution is characterized by equations (28)–(33) in the unknown func-
tions Vni (h), V
e
i , Ji, wi and variables h
c
i and θi.
If we add Assumption EtaChi, we get rewarded with a very tractable model:
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions ConstB, EtaChi and ResetH, the wage wi, the labor
market tightness θi and the critical home productivities hci are independent of the redraw
distribution F (h).
Proof. Since we have assumed that h0 < hc for all i, a worker with h0 always partic-
ipates, and her surplus satisfies
rΣWi (h0) = wi−b0−λiΣWi (h0)+∑
j
pi, jΣWj (h0)+χ
(
Vni −Vei
)−η(Vn−Vni (h0)) . (34)
Under Assumption EtaChi, this simplifies to
(r+χ+λi)ΣWi (h0) = wi−b0+∑
j
pi, jΣWj (h0) . (35)
Equations (31), (32), (33) and (35) are a system of 4Nz equations which determine
the 4Nz unknownswi, θi, ΣWi (h0) and Ji. The redraw distribution F (h) does not enter
these equations. The hci can then be determined by solving (28).
Equations (31), (32), (33) and (35) are equivalent to the equations in the standard
matching model (Mortensen and Nagypal, 9/2005, Section 2). That means that this
simplified model has implications for labor market tightness, job finding probabili-
ties and wages that are equivalent to the basic model. Again, what differs from the
basic model is the dynamics of the stocks of employment and unemployment. This
has already been explained in the comparative steady state analysis of Section 2.3.
Our model is as easy to analyze as the standard Pissarides model. In the fol-
lowing subsections we exploit this fact and first discuss existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium. Thenwewill establish that themodel contains the Pissaridesmodel
as a special case. The numerical results of Section 4 will show that the quantitative
effect of Assumptions ConstB, EtaChi and ResetH is relatively small, so that we
are not making a big mistake by resorting to the simple EWmodel.
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2.5.1 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
For some parameter values, in particular those where household productivity is
higher than unemployment benefits b0 with probability 1, there exists a degenerate
equilibrium where no firm posts vacancies, because no worker searchers for a job,
and no worker searchers for a job because no firm posts a vacancy. We are not inter-
ested in this type of equilibrium, but only look at equilibria where there is positive
employment and search in all aggregate states. Existence of such an equilibrium
depends on parameters. Obviously, if home productivity for all workers is higher
than market productivity, there will be no such equilibrium. If there is an equilib-
rium with vacancies and search in all aggregate states, we have seen that the model
under Assumption EtaChi is equivalent to the basic Pissarides model with respect
to the variables wages and labor market tightness. For a proof of uniqueness and
existence of equilibrium in this model, see Mortensen and Nagypal (9/2005, Propo-
sition 1).
2.5.2 The limit of constant participation
Under Assumptions ConstB, EtaChi and ResetH, our model reduces to the stan-
dard matching model with constant participation if the redraw distribution F (h)
has zero mass in the critical range.
To see this more formally, note first that Proposition 5 says that the critical val-
ues hci are independent of the redraw distribution F (h). Define h
c
min ≡ mini hci , and
hcmax accordingly. Under Assumption EtaChi, it is readily shown
9 that Γ(hcmax; t) =
F (hcmax) at any time t. Now assume that F (h) has zero mass in the range where par-
ticipation depends on the aggregate state: F (hcmax) = F (h
c
min). Then it follows that
Γ(hcmin; t) = F (hcmax) for all t, and the participation rate is constant at P(t) = F (hcmax).
We will later study the case where the redraw distribution is uniform in h¯±σ.
The model with constant participation is obtained for σ→ ∞.
9 Consider any set H with h≥ hc(t) for all h ∈H. In the case χ= η, the cross-sectional distribution
Γ(H;t) then follows the differential equation
dΓ(H;t)
d t
=−χΓ(H;t)+χF (H) (36)
If the economy starts out with Γ(H;0) = F (H), then Equation (36) implies that Γ(H;t) is constant, and
therefore Γ(H;t)= F (H). Notice that the term χF (H) in (36) is a consequence of the assumption χ= η;
if the employed redraw at a different rate than the non-employed, the dynamics of the cross-sectional
density is more complicated and depends on the current unemployment rate.
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2.6 Rigid wages
Several recent papers (Costain and Reiter, 2003; Hall, 2005; Shimer, 2005a) have
stressed that the failure of the standard matching model to explain the observed
dynamics of unemployment may be due to the assumption of Nash bargaining. In-
troducing some kind of real wage rigidity generates much higher unemployment
volatility in themodel and brings it closer to the data. Wage rigidity is not the focus
of our paper, and we do not provide any microfoundation for real wage rigidity10.
We illustrate that some degree of real wage rigidity helps to bring the model much
closer to the data, just as for the standard matching model without a participation
margin. The key aspect of wage rigidity is that firms get a bigger share of the to-
tal surplus during booms, such that they have a bigger incentive to hire workers.
To capture this in the simplest possible way, we assume that the firms’ bargaining
share is higher in booms than in recessions. Besides simplicity, this formulation has
the advantage that it guarantees privately efficient job separations.
3 Data and Calibration
This section briefly documents the time series behavior of unemployment, employ-
ment, and labor force participation in relation to output in the United States. Using
these data, we then turn to the calibration of our model.
3.1 Data
Our data series range from January 1976 to December 2001. Table 1 summarizes
the detrended data. Aggregate data on unemployment, employment, and partic-
ipation has been obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As a robustness
check we also compute the same statistics based on CPS micro data for the popula-
tion aged 16 to 65. The message is basically the same (as can be seen from Table 1).
We base the paper on the BLS numbers because they are computed for the entire
population—which is the set of agents consistent with our data on GDP and other
macroeconomic aggregates. Following Shimer (2005a), we remove a very low fre-
quency trend from the data, applying a Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter with a smooth-
ing parameter of 100000 to the logarithm of our quarterly data. We see that, over
our sample, the percentage change of the unemployment rate has a standard devi-
ation of 0.145 or seven times as large as GDP. These results are similar to Shimer’s
who finds 0.19. It is also widely agreed upon that detrended unemployment ex-
10Some interesting recent contributions include Hall and Milgrom (2005) and Kennan (2005).
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hibits very high persistence with quarterly autocorrelation of 0.968. The detrended
unemployment rate is strongly countercyclical as evidenced by a contemporaneous
correlation coefficient with GDP of -0.9.
Another important indicator of labor market activity is the employment rate
(employment/population ratio) which averages 61.2% over our sample. It is strongly
procyclical (it exhibits a contemporaneous cross-correlation with GDP of 0.9) and
highly persistent (autocorrelation is 0.96), with a variability of about two thirds of
that of GDP.
The average participation rate over our sample period is 65.35%. Persistence is
high (0.86), but slightly lower than for the employment and unemployment series.
The log-detrended participation rate is procyclical (correlation with GDP is 0.5) and
its standard deviation is 23% of output variability, or about one third of employ-
ment variability. It is important to note that our analysis focuses on the entire work-
ing age population of both sexes rather than restricting ourselves to certain age
groups as the previous papers in this literature (Faraglia, 2003; Garibaldi and Wasmer,
2005) have done. While the precise numbers we report are not identical to theirs,
the qualitative picture remains the same.
3.2 Calibration
This section describes the calibration of all the parameters in the benchmark mod-
els. Besides studying a benchmark case, we are going to vary several parameters
(σ, b, r, ρz α, ϑ, η) systematically and document the influence that they have on the
equilibrium.
The benchmark calibration, which applies equally to the flexible and the rigid
wage model, is summarized in Table 2. Numbers referring to flows are at quarterly
rates. The interest rate is 1.2 percent quarterly. For the process of aggregate pro-
ductivity, we choose a 15-state Markov chain that approximates the AR(1) process
zt+1 = ρzzt + ε, ε∼ N(0,σ2ε). (37)
We follow Cooley and Prescott (1995) and many papers in the RBC tradition and
choose ρz= 0.95 as our benchmark calibration. This facilitates the comparison of the
shock propagation in our model with the results in the RBC literature. However,
since this parameter turns out to be important for the variance of labor market
participation, we run a series of experiments varying ρz between 0.5 and 0.99. In
each case, we chooseσε= 0.0125
√
(1−ρ2z )which gives an unconditional variance of
z of 0.0125 (before filtering). The variance of z was chosen to approximately match
the variance of GDP in our preferred specification with rigid wages. Keeping this
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variance constant allows us to compare the magnification effects across different
specifications. Average productivity is always normalized to unity.
We normalize the efficiency parameter µ in the matching function to 1, which
implicitly scales the number of vacancies but otherwise has no real consequences.
Following much of the literature, we set the elasticity parameter ϑ in the Cobb
Douglas matching function to 0.5, and we pick the worker’s bargaining power to
equal the matching elasticity α= ϑ= 0.5 (Hosios condition).
The separation rate, χ is observed directly in our data and is equal to 9.9%
quarterly. This choice is consistent with the values reported in Shimer (2005a) and
Abowd and Zellner (1985). In each experiment, the median home productivity h¯
and the vacancy posting cost φ are chosen to match a steady state participation rate
of 65.35% and an unemployment rate of u = 6.37%. As explained in Section 2, we
set η= χ.
The flow utility of unemployment b
Shimer (2005a) chooses to interpret b entirely as unemployment benefit and sets
it to approximately 40% of mean labor income. More generally, we must allow
for some level of home productivity or utility of leisure, as well as the disutil-
ity of searching for a job. Thus, a priori it is hard to say what this number is.
Costain and Reiter (2003) propose to calibrate this number such that the model
generates the correct response of the steady state unemployment rate to long-run
changes in the unemployment benefit. They cite a semi-elasticity of unemployment
w.r.t. benefits b of 1.3 as the best point estimate. In ourmodel, we achieve this target
by setting b= 0.615.
The distribution of home productivity and aggregate labor supply
The redraw distribution of home productivity F (h) is hard to calibrate. In real-
ity, this distribution may have multiple modes, corresponding to different groups
of the population. What matters for our analysis is not the shape of the total dis-
tribution, but only the mass of agents near the threshold. Several recent articles
(den Haan, 2005; den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey, 2005; den Haan, Ramey, and Watson,
2000) have stressed this point in related models. We therefore start from the sim-
plest setup and assume a distribution with constant density, that means, a uniform
distribution in (h¯−σ, h¯+σ).11
11We have redone the analysis with a lognormal home productivity; this doesn’t change any rele-
vant conclusion.
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We have explained above how we choose the parameter h¯; it remains to find
σ. In our model, it measures the cross-sectional dispersion of home productiv-
ity. We have said that in the real world this should be interpreted as the differ-
ence betweenmarket and home productivity, which we call “relative productivity”
from now on. Since we are not aware of any measurement of the cross-sectional
dispersion of home productivity, we calibrate the model only through wage data.
Furthermore, wemeasure wage dispersion separately for men andwomen and cal-
ibrate the model by the within-group variation. This appears the most appropriate
measure, since gender is a permanent variable, while our home productivity is re-
drawn.
Therefore, separately for men and women, we define the wage ratio
φi ≡ Wage(3
rd decile, i)−Wage(1st decile, i)
Wage(2nd decile, i)
(38)
where i takes the values M (male) and F (female). We use data on the lower part
of the distribution only, because the participation decision is most critical for low
wage earners. Then we define φdata as the average over men and women, weighted
by the employment rates:
φdata = (EmplRateM ·φM+EmplRateF ·φF)/(EmplRateM +EmplRateF)
In the model, we identify this with
φmodel ≡ (Wage−h)(3
rd decile)− (Wage−h)(1st decile)
Wage(2nd decile)
(39)
where h is home productivity. Note that we use the same denominator in (39)
and (38), namely Wage(2nd decile), to scale the wage dispersion. Scaling it with
(Wage− h)(2nd decile) would require to take a stand what average h is in the data,
which is not clear. From the data (CPS outgoing rotation groups, average 1976-
1996) of Bernstein and Mishel (1997) we get φM = 0.425, φM = 0.281 and φdata = 0.363.
In each variant of the model, the σ is calibrated so as to set φdata = φmodel .
Note that the above procedure will give a good approximation to the dispersion
of relative productivity if there is little variation in home productivity within each
sex group and if there is a slightly positive correlation between market and home
productivity which compensates the variation in home productivity. In our bench-
mark model, this calibration leads to a value of f (h) = 12σ = 0.424. If we define labor
supply elasticity εPz as the elasticity of labor market participation to the change in
labor productivity in general equilibrium, we obtain using (19) and (22):
εPz = f (hc) d h
c
d z
z
P
= 0.424
αλ
(ϑ(r+χ)+αλ)
1
0.75
= 0.6035. (40)
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A labor supply elasticity of 0.6 lies well in the interval of recent microeconometric
estimates which stress the extensive margin (participation decision) of labor sup-
ply. Table 3 provides an overview of themost important studies; a broader and very
recent overview of the labor supply literature, not necessarily focused on partici-
pation, can be found in Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005, Table 7). If anything,
our elasticity is somewhat lower than the microeconometric estimates, contrary to
commonwisdom that assumes that macroeconomic models need higher elasticities
than what the microestimates deliver.
Rigid wages
In the model with flexible wages, α is constant. In the model with rigid wages,
we assume α(t) = 0.5−∆α log z(t). We see in the data that the wage fluctuations
are almost as big as GDP fluctuations, but that the correlation between the two
is rather small. Since we are interested in the wage fluctuations only insofar as
they are correlated with production, we target the systematic variability of wages
ρw,yσw/σy. We choose ∆α so as to match this target.
3.3 Simulation
Our theoretical model is in continuous time, but for simulation purposes we have
to discretize it. To stay true to the continuous time spirit, and since labor market
flows occur with high frequency, we choose one week as model period — or more
precisely, 1/48 of a year. The model is simulated for 1248 weeks, aggregated to
104 quarterly observations corresponding to the data from I/1976 to IV/2001, and
detrended using the log of the model-generated data with a smoothing parameter
of 105. We repeat these simulations 1000 times and report the mean and standard
deviations of the model-generated moments.12
4 Numerical Results
4.1 Variability of labor market aggregates
In this section we numerically evaluate the performance of our models. First we
investigate whether the model is able to explain the unconditional variances of
participation, employment and unemployment. Table 4 describes the data. As a
reference point, the first panel in Table 5 reports results for the model with constant
12 Matlab programs for solving and simulating the EW model are available from the authors on
request.
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participation (cf. Section 2.5.2). The second panel in Table 5 contains the results for
the benchmark EW-model with flexible wages. The constant participation version
differs from the benchmark only by setting the cross-sectional density around the
participation threshold equal to zero. The third panel in Table 5 presents results
for the DW-model with flexible wages. It only serves to demonstrate that the EW-
and the DW- model yield very similar results if Assumption ConstB is imposed,
thereby justifying the simplifications that lead to the EW-model.
Threemain conclusions emerge. First, themodel predicts the right variability of
participation relative to GDP, somewhat less that 0.25. This is remarkable, because
our calibration does not target this statistic. As wewill demonstrate below, the vari-
ability of participation depends mainly on the cross-sectional dispersion of home
productivities, σ, which was calibrated using observed wage data. The second
conclusion is that endogenous participation amplifies employment responses, as
we expected from Proposition 2. Employment variability (relative to GDP) is more
than four times higherwith endogenous thanwith constant participation, but it still
falls short of what we see in the data. Third, endogenous participation reinforces
the well known inability of the standard matching model to explain the variabil-
ity of unemployment. This was again expected from Proposition 2. In the data,
unemployment is roughly 6 times more volatile than GDP (cf Table 4), whereas
the model with constant participation only generates unemployment roughly as
volatile as GDP. When allowing for an endogenous participation decision, the ra-
tio of standard deviations falls further to 0.703. In Figure 2 we demonstrate the
robustness of these conclusions to parameter variations.
Since we have analytically shown that the dynamics of employment and unem-
ployment can be neatly separated into the dynamics of tightness and the dynamics
of the participation decision (Section 2.3.3), anything that improves the dynamics
of tightness in the standard model will also improve the model with endogenous
participation. Recently, several ways have been proposed how to bring the match-
ing model more in line with the data. Here we follow the most prominent of these
proposals, namely the introduction of wage rigidity (cf. Section 2.6). In Section 5
we will investigate another proposal, namely a calibration with very small match
surplus.
Table 6 contains the results with rigid wages. We see that rigid wages increase
unemployment variability sevenfold. We now match the variability of participa-
tion, employment, unemployment and vacancies quite well. The model generates
a strong magnification of productivity shocks, a consequence of the strong fluctu-
ation in employment. The variability of the participation rate is now somewhat
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smaller than in the data, but notice that the systematic variability (standard devi-
ation times correlation with GDP) is still slightly higher in the model than in the
data.
From Proposition 2 we know that the crucial statistic that determines partici-
pation dynamics is the cross sectional density of home productivity at the partic-
ipation threshold. A high density implies more inflows into participation when a
positive productivity shock hits, which increases employment variability and re-
duces unemployment variability. The bottom row of Figure 1 clearly illustrates this
tradeoff.
4.2 Cyclicality of unemployment
Table 6 shows that our model with endogenous participation generates a counter-
cyclical unemployment rate, in line with the data. This must be considered a major
success of the model, given that earlier attempts to endogenize participation re-
ported a positive correlation. With flexible wages (Table 5), the negative correlation
is not yet strong enough. With rigid wages (Table 6), the correlation is as strong in
the model as in the data.
Why does our model succeed where earlier attempts have failed? Three ele-
ments are crucial to obtain the strong anticyclical movement of unemployment.
The first and most important element is again the cross sectional density of home
productivity. If this density is high, the flow from nonparticipation into unem-
ployment after a productivity increase is so big that it takes a lot of time to match
the newly unemployed. This leads to a positive correlation of unemployment and
GDP, which is evident from the top row of Figure 1. The figure also illustrates the
effect of the second element, namely time aggregation. At higher frequencies, the
correlation is less negative, because the inflow of new unemployed is measured
before they are absorbed into employment. In discrete time models with quarterly
time periods this effect is very strong, because people are unemployed for at least a
quarter. Third, a stronger reaction of tightness, and therefore hiring, makes that the
newly unemployed get absorbed faster, so that the negative correlation becomes
stronger. This has already been demonstrated by the comparison of the flexible
with the rigid wage model.
These results imply an important tradeoff for the calibration of themodel: higher
cross-sectional density helps to match employment fluctuations, but it reduces the
fluctuation of unemployment, and tends to make the correlation between unem-
ployment and production positive. For example, Veracierto (2004) calibrates his
model so as to match the variability of employment, which implies a high labor
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supply elasticity.13 This explains why the model generates procyclical unemploy-
ment.
4.3 Dynamic Responses
Recently it has been argued that a model may well match unconditional moments
but yet provide a distorted picture of an economy’s dynamic response to individ-
ual shocks (Galí, 1999). In Figure 3 we illustrate the response of our model to a unit
shock in observed labor productivity. In the first column we see that employment
basically does not respond in the standard, constant-participation model, whereas
there is a significant increase in the data. The endogenous participation decision
(column 2) substantially improves employment responses, and finally wage rigid-
ity (columns 3) bring the magnitude of the employment response in line with the
data. It is worth noting that the model is able to generate the hump-shaped re-
sponse observed in the data. However, with rigid wages the model probably reacts
to strongly on impact. The flipside is of course that wages respond too strongly
in the flexible wage model. Even in the rigid wage case the wage response is too
strong, although we have calibrated the model to match the systematic wage vari-
ation. This difference can arise because impulse response functions measure con-
ditional covariances, while we have matched the unconditional covariance.
Let us turn to the focus of this paper, the dynamics of participation. The mag-
nitude of the response of the participation rate is well captured both by the flexible
and the rigid wage model. Again, the response is more delayed in the data than in
the model.
4.4 Composition Effects
If we drop AssumptionConstB, we know from the discussion of Proposition 3 that
changes in aggregate productivity change the composition of the unemployment
pool, and thereby affect the incentives for firms to create vacancies. To illustrate
these effects most drastically, we now adopt a specification that is the opposite ex-
treme of Assumption ConstB: we assume that households enjoy their full home
production even while looking for a job; they only face a constant search cost of
20 percent of average labor productivity. That means, b(h) = h− 0.2. Otherwise,
the specification is unchanged. The results can be found in the bottom panel of Ta-
13Veracierto does not allow for heterogeneity across workers. Decisions in his model are taken
by a representative household with many members. Labor supply elasticity is determined by the
curvature of the utility function.
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ble 5. The model now produces strongly counterfactual results, the unemployment
rate being procyclical. What happens after a positive productivity shock? More
people enter the labor market; since they are marginal, their surplus from a job
(the difference between home and market productivity) is small. Since the match
surplus is shared between firm and worker, this tends to decrease the expected re-
turn from a filled vacancy, therefore dampening even more the positive effect of a
productivity shock on vacancy creation. This is what we expect after the discus-
sion of Section 2.3. It manifests itself as an increased variability of wages, and a
strongly decreased variability of vacancies. The additional vacancies in a boom are
not sufficient to absorb the additional labor market participants, and unemploy-
ment becomes procyclical.
We interpret this outcome not as a result of how the participation decision is
modeled, but yet again as a consequence of the wage determinationmechanism. In
a boom, very little of the additional production is left for firms as an incentive for
vacancy creation. Endogenous participation, in this variant of the model, amplifies
this shortcoming. Our specification with rigid wages tries to overcome this prob-
lem, although in a simplistic way. We can do the same thing here, using the same
degree of bargaining power variation. The results are in the bottompanel of Table 6.
Comparing this to the middle panel we still see the same mechanism at work: the
increased share of marginal workers in booms dampens the unemployment fluctu-
ations. But now we are only talking about quantitative details, not the qualitative
picture. Unemployment variability relative to GDP is reduced from 5.2 to 4.8, and
the unemployment rate is still almost perfectly negatively correlatedwith GDP. The
simple model appears to be a good approximation to the general model. Whether
those quantitative details make it worthwhile to undergo the technical complica-
tions of the full model will depend on the purpose of the exercise.
How important are composition effects?
If the unemployed are heterogeneous (b(h) not constant), aggregate fluctuations
induce changes in the composition of the unemployment pool. In booms, workers
with higher home productivity enter the labor market. This tends to reduce the
average match surplus, and therefore dilutes the gains from higher productivity
for firms. This further dampens the variability of labor market tightness over the
business cycle, which is already too low in the model with exogenous participa-
tion. How important is this composition effect in reality? Insofar as workers differ
in home productivity, as assumed in our model, the effect is probably real, since
the assumption b(h) = b0 appears hard to justify; even when searching for a job,
24
workers do probably enjoy most of their home productivity.
If in reality most of the heterogeneity among workers comes through differ-
ences inmarket wages, there is no reasonable analogue to AssumptionConstB. New
entrants will have a smaller job surplus than workers already in the market. To
what extent this affects vacancy creation will depend on the degree of market seg-
regation. Low wage earners entering the market will mostly compete with work-
ers earning a marginally higher wage, not with high wage earners from a different
profession. Then the average match surplus in each market will change little over
the cycle. Based on this, we conjecture that the composition effect and the resulting
dampening of vacancy creation is much less severe in reality than in our DW-model
with b(h) = h− 0.2. Still, it is clear that endogenous participation makes it harder
to explain unemployment fluctuations, not easier.
4.5 Labor Market Flows
Table 8 compares average labor market flows in the data and in the benchmark
model. We see that the model does not do well in explaining these flows. The most
important failings are the following. First, the model grossly underpredicts the
flow from nonparticipation to employment. In the model, a worker has to become
unemployed to have a chance to find a job. The observed flow from nonparticipa-
tion to employment only consists of the households that enter the unemployment
pool and get a job before they are measured as unemployed (observations of la-
bor market states are monthly). This time aggregation effect, however, explains
only 20% of the observed flow. To fix this, one needs a model where also non-
participants can look for a job, with a lower intensity than the unemployed.
Second, the model does not explain the big flow from unemployment to non-
participation. It seems there are many households in the data set that are close to
the participationmargin, and then switch back and forth frequently. To explain this,
the model would have to allow for small temporary fluctuations in productivity,
which our model doesn’t.
Third, when households separate from a job, 60 percent of them become non-
participants in the data, but only about 25 percent in the model. To explain this,
one probably needs endogenous separation, such that people typically have low
market productivity when they separate, as in Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005).
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5 Small Surplus Calibration
In a recent paper that has drawn considerable attention, Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2005) propose a new calibration of matching models which they claim solves the
well known problem of the standard matching model, namely the insufficient vari-
ability of the unemployment rate. They propose to increase the variability of un-
employment in the model by assuming that the match surplus is very small.14 In
their calibration, the flow value of unemployment benefits (including the value of
leisure when unemployed) is 94.3 percent of labor productivity in steady state.
This may appear implausible, but Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) justify their
calibration, saying that “ ... our estimate [· · · ] represents the value of unemploy-
ment for themarginal worker, who finds employment quickly.” Mortensen and Nagypal
(9/2005, Section 3.3) have already pointed out that this argument is irrelevant, since
what matters is not the surplus of the marginal, but of the average worker. In our
model, this can be seen from Equ. (20). Home productivity enters through B(hc),
which is the average home productivity of the unemployed, not the home produc-
tivity of the marginal labor market participant. The explanation is obvious: since
firms do not know which worker they will be matched to, it is the average home
productivity that determines the expected match surplus, and therefore vacancy
creation.
In our framework, the idea of a small (average) match-surplus can be imple-
mented in two ways. First, we can adopt Assumption ConstB and say that all the
unemployed have the same, very high, flow utility, analogous to the specification
in the standard matching framework. Note that this is a very artificial approach.
In our calibration, home productivity varies widely, but while searching, all the
unemployed get the same flow of utility that is close to the utility of working. If
we follow this approach, the theoretical results of Section 2 already tell us that the
model is equivalent to the standard model with respect to the fluctuation of the
job finding rate. In this case, we are left with the same merits and problems of the
model that have already been discussed in other papers (Costain and Reiter, 2003;
Mortensen and Nagypal, 9/2005). This is confirmed by the results in the middle
panel of Table 7.
Our DW model allows a second, more natural way of implementing the idea
14Costain and Reiter (2003) had already observed that a small match surplus makes unemploy-
ment fluctuate strongly in the standard matching model, but then concluded that this calibration is
inappropriate since it implies an extremely high elasticity of unemployment with respect to long-run
changes in unemployment benefits, contrary to what one finds in the data. We will see that the same
argument applies in the model with endogenous participation.
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of a small match surplus. Since the match surplus is about zero for the marginal
worker, the average surplus is small if workers are sufficiently homogenous. In our
model, heterogeneity is measured by the parameter σ— the cross sectional disper-
sion of the difference betweenmarket and home productivity. Small average match
surplus then requires a low value of σ. For concreteness, take the flow utility of the
unemployed as b(h) = 0.4+ 0.5h. The 0.4 corresponds to unemployment benefits,
and the slope parameter of 0.5 implies that at the critical level of h≈ 0.95, the unem-
ployed obtain a similar level of utility as if they were staying at home. We choose
σ= 0.08 to obtain an average surplus of about 0.06 as in Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2005)15. The results for this calibration are given in the bottom panel of Table 7.
We see what we had already expected for such a low cross-sectional dispersion of
home productivity: labor supply elasticity is very high, and this implies procyclical
unemployment. This implementation of the idea of a small match surplus is clearly
inconsistent with the data.
6 Conclusions
We contribute to the equilibrium unemployment literature by proposing a simple,
tractable job matching model with endogenous participation decision. Our model
fits micro- and macro evidence well and can be extended in a straightforwardman-
ner. In fact it is not harder to solve than the standard Mortensen/Pissaridesmodel.
When it comes to matching the business cycle facts of participation, employment
and unemployment, our calibration is much more successful than earlier attempts
with endogenous participation. We show that a sufficiently low elasticity of labor
supply on the extensive margin is necessary to generate countercyclical unemploy-
ment rates and avoid the counterfactual implications of the earlier literature.
Compared to a standard matching model with exogenous participation, our
model generates a much stronger magnification mechanism of technology shocks
by increasing the variability of employment. However, the samemechanism damp-
ens the variability of unemployment and aggravates the well known problem that
standard models cannot match unemployment fluctuations well. In an extension
we follow some recent papers and introduce real wage rigidity. In this case the
model explains the variability and correlation structure of the labor market very
well.
15 A participation rate of 75% and σ = 0.08, imply a spread between the marginal worker and the
lower bound of the support of 0.12. If the marginal worker is indifferent, the average current surplus
will be 0.012 ·0.5 = 0.06.
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The simplicity of our model will allow many extensions (for example physical
capital, nominal rigidities) in future work. Two promising avenues are endogenous
separations of job matches (den Haan et al., 2000) and household labor supply de-
cisions (Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir, 2005; Faraglia, 2003).
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First we derive the wage curve. For convenience, let us re-
state the relevant equations here:
(r+η+λ)Vn (h) = b(h)+λVe (h)+ηVn for h≤ hc (41)
(r+η)Vn (h) = h+ηVn for h> hc (42)
hc = b(hc)+λ (Ve (hc)−Vn (hc)) . (43)
Ve (h) =
w(h)+χVn
r+χ (44)
J (h) =
z−w(h)
r+χ (45)
αJ (h) = (1−α)(Ve (h)−Vn (h)) . (46)
Equations (41 – 46) directly correspond to Equations (7 – 11) in the main text.
First subtract Vn (h) from both sides of Equation (44) and plug it into the right
hand side of (46). Substitute Equation (45) into the left hand side of (46). Simplify
and obtain:
αz= w(h)+ (1−α)(χVn− (r+χ)Vn (h)) . (47)
Then combine (44) with (41) and eliminate Ve (h):
(r+χ)(r+η+λ)Vn (h) = (r+χ)b(h)+λw(h)+ (λχ+ηr+ηχ)Vn. (48)
Then combine (48) with (47) to eliminate Vn (h) and obtain:
w(h) =
r+η+λ
r+η+αλαz+
r+χ
r+η+αλ (1−α)b(h)+
η−χ
r+η+αλ (1−α)rVn (49)
which is the wage curve (13). From the last term it is easy to see that imposing
EtaChi eliminates all references to the threshold home productivity hc. Finally, As-
sumption ConstB assures that all references to home productivity disappear and
the wage curve is equivalent to the standard textbook model.
To derive the job creation condition, insert (10) into (12):
φ
q(θ) =
 hc
−∞
z−w(h)
r+χ dF(h)
1
F(hc)
Rearranging (A) we obtain the job creation curve (14).
From thewage curve in (49) we immediately see that thewage is independent of
home productivity h under assumption ConstB. This lets us write the job creation
condition as in (16).
We have thus shown that assumptions ConstB and EtaChi imply a wage curve
and job creation condition that are identical to the standard, constant participation
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model. Equilibrium wages and tightness follow from these two equations, so they
must be identical to the standard textbook model, too.
Proof of Proposition 2. In steady state, flows into and out-of each pool have to equal.
Since F(hc) is the probability that an agent participates after receiving a new draw
of home productivity, the flow equations for employment (e) and non-participation
(ν) are given by
Employment : uλ = χe (50)
Non-Participation : (χe+ηu)(1−F(hc)) = ηF(hc)ν (51)
where u is unemployment. Population is normalized to unity, so we have
e+u+ν= 1 (52)
Solve (52) for ν and insert it into (51). Then solve (50) for u and insert it into (51).
Using the assumption η = χ, this gives Equ. (17). Equ. (18) follows from (17) and
(50). We obtain Equ. (19) by adding up (17) and (18), since p= e+u.
In the following proofs, for compactness of notation, we are going to use xˆ
(rather than dx) to denote the change in the equilibrium value of any variable x.
Proof of Proposition 3. For the relevant case h≤ hc, workers’ surplus satisfies
rΣW (h) = w(h)−b(h)−λΣW (h)+χ(Vn−Ve (h))−η(Vn−Vn (h)) (53)
In the case η= χ, this simplifies to
(r+χ+λ)ΣW (h) = w(h)−b(h) (54)
Combining (10), (11) and (54) we get
αz−w(h)
r+χ = (1−α)
w(h)−b(h)
r+χ+λ (55)
We can solve (55) for the wage:
w(h) =
α(r+χ+λ)z+(1−α)(r+χ)(b(h))
r+χ+αλ (56)
Using (56) in (10), we get
J (h) =
(1−α)(z−b(h))
r+χ+αλ (57)
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Inserting (57) into (12), using λ = θq(θ), we get
(r+χ+αθq(θ))φ= q(θ) (1−α)
[
z− 1
F(hc)
 hc
−∞
b(h) dF(h)
]
(58)
Substituting the definition (21) and taking total differentials in (58), we get
αφ[q(θ)+θq′(θ)] θˆ= (1−α)[q′(θ)(z−B(hc)) θˆ+q(θ)(zˆ− bˆ0−B′ (hc) hˆc)] (59)
Using q(θ) = θ−ϑ and multiplying both sides in (59) by θ−ϑ gives
αφ(1−ϑ)θˆ = (1−α)
[
−ϑz−B(h
c)
θ θˆ+
(
zˆ− bˆ0−B′ (hc) hˆc
)]
(60)
Multiplying (58) by α/(r+χ+αλ), we get
αφ= αλθ (1−α)
z−B(hc)
r+χ+αλ (61)
Using (61) in (60) and rearranging we obtain (20).
Proof of Proposition 4. From (57), using the bargaining condition (11), we get
ΣW (h) = α(z−b(h))
r+χ+αλ (62)
Plugging (62) into (8) and using λ = θq(θ), we get
hc =
αθq(θ) z+(r+χ)(b(hc))
r+χ+αθq(θ) (63)
Multiplying (63) by r+χ+αθq(θ) and taking total differentials, we get
α[q(θ)+θq′(θ)]hcθˆ+(r+χ+αθq(θ)) hˆc
= α[q(θ)+θq′(θ)] zθˆ+αθq(θ) zˆ+(r+χ)(bˆ0+b′ (hc) hˆc) (64)
This can be rearranged to give
hˆc =
α [q(θ)+θq′(θ)] (z−hc)θˆ+αθq(θ) zˆ+(r+χ)(bˆ0+b′ (hc) hˆc)
r+χ+αθq(θ)
=
αλzˆ+(r+χ)(bˆ0+b′ (hc) hˆc)
r+χ+αλ +
α(1−ϑ)λ(z−hc)
r+χ+αλ
θˆ
θ (65)
Plugging (20) and (63) into the last expression in (65), we get
hˆc =
αλzˆ+(r+χ)(bˆ0+b′ (hc) hˆc)
r+χ+αλ
+Φ α(1−ϑ)λ
(r+χ+αλ)
(r+χ)
(ϑ(r+χ)+αλ)
(
zˆ− bˆ0−B′ (hc) hˆc
)
(66)
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where
Φ= (z−b(h
c))
z−B(hc) (67)
Φ is the ratio of the instantaneous match surplus of the marginal participant (z−
b(hc)) and the average instantaneous match surplus (z−B(hc)). Since the marginal
participant has the higher home productivity, we have
0≤Φ≤ 1 (68)
Note that Φ= 1 under Assumption ConstB.
We can write (66) as
κhhˆc = κzzˆ+κbbˆ0 (69)
where
κh = 1− (r+χ)r+χ+αλb
′ (hc)+Φ α(1−ϑ)λ
(r+χ+αλ)
(r+χ)
(ϑ(r+χ)+αλ)B
′ (hc) (70a)
κz = αλr+χ+αλ +Φ
α(1−ϑ)λ
(r+χ+αλ)
(r+χ)
(ϑ(r+χ)+αλ) (70b)
κb = r+χr+χ+αλ −Φ
α(1−ϑ)λ
(r+χ+αλ)
(r+χ)
(ϑ(r+χ)+αλ) (70c)
Using the inequalities (1), (68) and 0≤ B′ (hc)≤ 1, we can derive
αλ
r+χ+αλ ≤ κh ≤
(r+χ)(ϑ(r+χ)+αλ)+αλ (r+χ+αλ)
(r+χ+αλ)(ϑ(r+χ)+αλ) (71a)
αλ
r+χ+αλ ≤ κz ≤
αλ
ϑ(r+χ)+αλ (71b)
ϑ(r+χ)
ϑ(r+χ)+αλ ≤ κb ≤
r+χ
r+χ+αλ (71c)
Equations (22) and (24) follow from (69) and (70) using B′ (hc) = b′ (hc) = 0 and
Φ = 1. The inequalities (23) and (25) follow from (69) and (71). For example, the
first inequality in (23) is obtained by combining the first inequality in (71b) with the
second inequality in (71a).
Appendix B The differentiated-wage model
The equations of the DW-model are very similar to Equ. (28)–(33) of the EW-model.
The main difference is that the wage depends on home productivity, and that most
variables now depend on the cross-sectional distribution of home productivity, as
was explained in Section 2.4. We therefore write V ni,Ω (h) rather than Vni (h), etc. The
subscript i still refers to the realization of aggregate productivity, while Ω refers to
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all other state variables. In theory,Ω contains the whole cross-sectional distribtuion
of home productivity. In the numerical approximation, this has to be replaced by a
finite-dimensional vector characterizing this distribution. Furthermore, the equa-
tions for Vni,Ω (h), etc., include terms that capture the effect of the change in Ω on
Vni,Ω (h).
The model then consists of Equ. (27) plus the following equations:
Participation decision:
rV ni,Ω (h) = η
(
Vni,Ω−Vni,Ω (h)
)
+∑
j
pi, jV
n
j,Ω (h)+
dVni,Ω (h)
dΩ
dΩ
dt
+max
{
b(h)+λi,Ω (Vei,Ω (h)−Vni,Ω (h)) ,h} (72)
The threshold level of home productivity:
hci,Ω = b
(
hci,Ω
)
+λi,Ω (Vei,Ω (h)−Vni,Ω (hci,Ω)) (73)
Value of the employed:
rV ei,Ω (h) = wi,Ω(h)+χ
(
Vni,Ω−Vei,Ω (h)
)
+∑
j
pi, jV
e
j,Ω (h)+
dV ei,Ω (h)
dΩ
dΩ
dt
(74)
Value of a filled job:
(r+χ)Ji,Ω (h) = zi−wi,Ω(h)+∑
j
pi, jJ j,Ω (h)+
dJi,Ω (h)
dΩ
dΩ
dt
(75)
Bargaining condition:
αJi,Ω (h) = (1−α)(Vei,Ω (h)−Vni,Ω (h)) (76)
Numerical solution
As mentioned above, the vector of state variables includes the cross-sectional
distribution of home productivity, which is an infinite-dimensional object. To com-
pute an approximate solution, we use a state-aggregation approach similar to Krusell and Smith
(1998), where value functions are written as functions of a finite number of statistics
(moments) of this distribution. The algorithm we use is described in Reiter (2002).
The statistics we use are the fraction of non-employed households, and the average
home productivity of the non-employed.
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Appendix C Data Sources
All labor market series originate from the BLS website and are seasonally adjusted.
Age is 16 years and older. The participation rate series (Id LNS11300000); the un-
employment rate series (Id LNS14000000); the employment population rate series
(Id LNS12300000).
The remaining series are all available via the FRED database. All are seasonally
adjusted. Real GDP (2000=100) can be obtained via
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC1/106.
Vacancies are measured by the help-wanted index
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/HELPWANT/10(1987=100);
the wage series is average hourly earnings, total private industries
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ahetpi/10.
It is deflated using the private consumption expenditure price index
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/pcepi/21 (Base 2000).
Labor productivity is measured as output per worker and was constructed by
Robert Shimer. For additional details, please see his webpage,
http://home.uchicago.edu/~shimer/data/mmm/.
When available, all series were downloaded at a monthly frequency and con-
verted to quarterly frequency by averaging. GDP and output/worker are at quar-
terly frequency.
Appendix D Tables
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Table 2: Baseline Calibration (flexible and rigid wages)
Parameters Symbol Value
Interest rate r 0.012
AR(1) labor productivity ρz 0.95
Stand.dev. labor productivity σz 0.0039
Scaling Parameter of Matching Function µ 1
Elasticity of Matching Function ϑ 0.5
Mean bargaining parameter α 0.5
Variation bargaining parameter (only rigid wages) ∆α 5.180
Exogenous Job Separation Prob. χ 0.099
Redraw Probability of home production η 0.099
Flow utility of unemployment b 0.6125
Density of home production f (h) = 12σ 0.424
Median home production h¯ 0.360
Vacancy posting costs φ 1.398
Matched facts
Unemployment Rate 0.0638
Participation Rate 0.654
Long-run elasticity of unemployment
with respect to benefits 1.3
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Data.
Mean σx σxσGDP ρ−1 ρqx,GDP
Participation rate 65.354 0.50 0.231 0.877 0.549
Employment rate 61.205 1.43 0.660 0.955 0.896
Unemployment 4.150 14.26 6.566 0.947 -0.918
Vacancies 81.481 18.63 8.581 0.952 0.821
Real wage 0.128 1.51 0.694 0.972 0.109
Real GDP 6888.580 2.17 1.000 0.932 1.000
Data sample period: 1/1976 – 12/2001. All statistics except the mean have
been computed using HP-detrended series in logs with smoothing parameter
λ = 100000. Column (σx) reports standard deviations in percent. Column ( σxσGDP )
reports the standard deviation of each series relative to the standard deviation of
GDP. Column (ρ−1) reports autocorrelations. Columns (ρx,GDP) report correlations
with GDP at quarterly, monthly, and annual frequency, respectively.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the Flexible Wage Model.
Mean σx σxσGDP ρ−1 ρqx,GDP ρmx,GDP ρax,GDP
Results with Constant Participation.
Participation rate 65.318 0.000 0.000 0.953 0.846 0.816 0.877
Employment rate 61.145 0.085 0.066 0.924 0.965 0.935 0.988
Unemployment 4.173 1.239 0.968 0.924 -0.965 -0.935 -0.988
Vacancies 0.977 1.579 1.241 0.802 0.972 0.957 0.989
Real wage 97.515 1.174 0.919 0.884 1.000 1.000 1.000
Real GDP 61.159 1.279 1.000 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000
Results with Endogenous Participation, EW .
Participation rate 65.365 0.358 0.227 0.953 0.911 0.887 0.932
Employment rate 61.188 0.428 0.271 0.959 0.896 0.855 0.929
Unemployment 4.177 1.084 0.703 0.611 -0.498 -0.286 -0.748
Vacancies 0.979 2.504 1.618 0.736 0.875 0.839 0.922
Real wage 97.515 1.174 0.751 0.884 0.988 0.987 0.990
Real GDP 61.210 1.569 1.000 0.913 1.000 1.000 1.000
Results with Endogenous Participation, DW, b(h) = b0.
Participation rate 65.353 0.365 0.227 0.953 0.910 0.886 0.934
Employment rate 61.218 0.447 0.279 0.958 0.904 0.866 0.936
Unemployment 4.135 1.159 0.736 0.692 -0.636 -0.436 -0.845
Vacancies 0.989 2.721 1.733 0.749 0.888 0.856 0.933
Real wage 97.489 1.164 0.735 0.884 0.988 0.987 0.990
Real GDP 61.239 1.591 1.000 0.913 1.000 1.000 1.000
Results with Endogenous Participation, DW, b(h) = h−0.2.
Participation rate 65.308 0.383 0.248 0.952 0.914 0.887 0.934
Employment rate 61.153 0.407 0.263 0.965 0.848 0.789 0.892
Unemployment 4.155 1.085 0.724 0.591 0.359 0.424 0.280
Vacancies 0.981 1.379 0.907 0.742 0.870 0.812 0.935
Real wage 92.658 1.213 0.796 0.888 0.989 0.988 0.990
Real GDP 61.174 1.531 1.000 0.913 1.000 1.000 1.000
Averages over 1000 simulations of length 104 quarters. All statistics except the
mean have been computed using HP-detrended series in logs with smoothing pa-
rameter λ = 100000. Column (σx) reports standard deviations in percent. Column
( σxσGDP ) reports the standard deviation of each series relative to the standard devia-
tion of GDP. Column (ρ−1) reports autocorrelations. Columns (ρx,GDP) report corre-
lations with GDP at quarterly, monthly, and annual frequency, respectively.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Rigid Wage Model.
Mean σx σxσGDP ρ−1 ρqx,GDP ρmx,GDP ρax,GDP
Results with Endogenous Participation, EW.
Participation rate 65.325 0.360 0.150 0.952 0.915 0.897 0.933
Employment rate 61.063 1.227 0.513 0.936 0.981 0.970 0.990
Unemployment 4.262 12.393 5.234 0.920 -0.981 -0.963 -0.993
Vacancies 1.011 17.472 7.420 0.792 0.914 0.873 0.957
Real wage 97.454 0.706 0.299 0.851 0.910 0.872 0.947
Real GDP 61.101 2.380 1.000 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000
Results with Endogenous Participation, DW, b(h) = h−0.2.
Participation rate 65.302 0.373 0.160 0.951 0.912 0.892 0.929
Employment rate 61.089 1.148 0.496 0.936 0.980 0.968 0.988
Unemployment 4.213 11.174 4.868 0.918 -0.982 -0.964 -0.994
Vacancies 1.011 15.857 6.942 0.793 0.920 0.879 0.962
Real wage 92.527 0.700 0.323 0.593 -0.438 -0.394 -0.527
Real GDP 61.125 2.304 1.000 0.919 1.000 1.000 1.000
Averages over 1000 simulations of length 104 quarters. All statistics except the
mean have been computed using HP-detrended series in logs with smoothing pa-
rameter λ = 100000. Column (σx) reports standard deviations in percent. Column
( σxσGDP ) reports the standard deviation of each series relative to the standard devia-
tion of GDP. Column (ρ−1) reports autocorrelations. Columns (ρx,GDP) report corre-
lations with GDP at quarterly, monthly, and annual frequency, respectively.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Small-Surplus Calibrations.
Mean σx σxσGDP ρ−1 ρqx,GDP ρmx,GDP ρax,GDP
Results with Endogenous Participation, EW.
Participation rate 65.410 0.209 0.098 0.950 0.885 0.862 0.900
Employment rate 60.868 1.007 0.471 0.929 0.976 0.962 0.987
Unemployment 4.542 10.376 4.883 0.919 -0.980 -0.963 -0.993
Vacancies 0.927 14.802 6.988 0.780 0.914 0.875 0.956
Real wage 97.239 0.694 0.332 0.877 0.979 0.970 0.986
Real GDP 60.899 2.120 1.000 0.914 1.000 1.000 1.000
Results with Endogenous Participation, DW, b(h) = 0.4+0.5h.
Participation rate 65.833 5.422 0.836 0.952 0.994 0.987 0.998
Employment rate 61.655 5.505 0.848 0.963 0.992 0.988 0.995
Unemployment 4.178 12.497 2.012 0.576 0.334 0.282 0.423
Vacancies 0.997 16.581 2.644 0.687 0.581 0.494 0.690
Real wage 99.126 1.115 0.176 0.885 0.844 0.802 0.879
Real GDP 61.787 6.473 1.000 0.959 1.000 1.000 1.000
Averages over 1000 simulations of length 104 quarters. All statistics except the
mean have been computed using HP-detrended series in logs with smoothing pa-
rameter λ = 100000. Column (σx) reports standard deviations in percent. Column
( σxσGDP ) reports the standard deviation of each series relative to the standard devia-
tion of GDP. Column (ρ−1) reports autocorrelations. Columns (ρx,GDP) report corre-
lations with GDP at quarterly, monthly, and annual frequency, respectively.
Table 8: Monthly Flows in Data and Benchmark Model.
Data Benchmark Model
Unempl. Home Empl. Unempl. Home Empl.
U 0.663 0.141 0.225 U 0.613 0.008 0.379
H 0.022 0.951 0.027 H 0.019 0.976 0.005
E 0.012 0.018 0.970 E 0.019 0.008 0.973
Averages over 1000 simulations of length 104 quarters.
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Appendix E Graphs
Figure 1: Correlations and Variances for rigid and flexible model.
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The benchmark calibration is indicated by the horizontal lines.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity to parameter changes
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The benchmark calibration is indicated by the horizontal lines. We see that the parameters
ϑ and r have no significant effect on any of the variances. The other parameters do have
some effect, in particular if one considers extreme values. A higher benefit level b reduces
the match surplus and increases the variability of unemployment, as we have discussed
after Proposition 4. Lowering workers’ bargaining share α reduces the responsiveness of
the participation threshold (Equ. (22)) and thereby the variability of participation. A lower
redraw probability η increases the variability of all labor market aggregates, which seems
to work in favor of the model. Nevertheless, we have argued in Section 2.2 that this is
probably artificial, so we do not follow it up here. Finally, a higher persistance of the
technology shock, ρz, increases the variance of participation. A worker at the participation
threshold is lured into the labor market by an increase in productivity only if the increase
is sufficiently persistent so as to make the investment of being unemployed worthwhile.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions
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Models are in columns. The first column pertains to the standard model with constant
participation. In column 2 we find the responses of the flexible wage (EW) model with
endogenous participation, and column 3 shows responses for the rigid wage model with a
participation decision.
The bold black line is the local projection impulse response function (Jorda, 2005) estimated
for the data in response to a unit shock in productivity. The data has been orthogonalized
using the Cholesky decomposition, the ordering is as presented in the figure, i.e. labor pro-
ductivity, employment rate, participation rate, real wage. The central dotted line represents
the average response of the simulated data. The two outer dotted lines are such that 950 of
1000 computed responses lie within them.
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